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Abstract—MODES_SNM project aimed at developing a pro-
totype for a mobile, modular detection system for radioactive
sources and Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Its main goal was
to deliver a tested prototype of a modular mobile system capable
of passively detecting weak or shielded radioactive sources with
accuracy higher than that of currently available systems. By
the end of the project all the objectives have been successfully
achieved.
Results from the laboratory commissioning and the field tests
are presented in this publication.
Index Terms—Radiation monitoring, National security, Neu-
trons, Radioactive materials, Radiation detectors, Special Nuclear
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I. INTRODUCTION
THERE is no doubt that nuclear threats represent a majorconcern for today’s world. The existence of conventional
nuclear weapons and incident-related radiation contaminations
are two issues well known to the public. In addition, various
types of radioactive materials can be used to build Improvised
Nuclear Devices (INDs) or Radiological Dispersion Devices
(RDDs or “dirty bombs”); they require simpler technologies
than those needed to build conventional nuclear weapons,
while retaining the capability to affect large areas and popu-
lations. Therefore it is of primary importance to prevent illicit
transportation of these radiological and nuclear materials.
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Today’s approach to nuclear detection relies primarily on
fixed inspection portals placed at Border Crossing Points
(BCPs; the so-called “ports of entry”) or in other transportation
modes; whereas their presence still represents an advancement
in security procedures, concerns have been raised about the
possibility that strongly shielded or masked nuclear material
might not be detected by those portals. A substantial improve-
ment would be needed to achieve the capability to detect
nuclear materials with improved detection systems anywhere
within the transportation infrastructure. Hence, recent years
have seen a large extension of research projects in the field
of mobile/portable detection instruments, to which this work
belongs.
II. MODES_SNM PROJECT OVERVIEW
The project MODES_SNM (MOdular DEtection System for
Special Nuclear Material) has been supported by the European
Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7)
and comprised seven participants from five different countries
[1]. The goal of the project was to develop a mobile and
modular detection system specially designed for SNM1 but
also with the capability of detecting all radioactive sources.
A special focus was put into the versatility of the system.
The van mounted configuration was selected for the field
demonstration to allow efficient movement of the system
across several countries and to experience maximum number
of operational scenarios. However, the modules were designed
in a portable way such that scenarios outside the vans could be
tested as well; in fact, during the course of the tests, the system
was frequently deployed in a non-mobile mode. Portability
was also an important design consideration for the individual
system components, and maximum weights were applied to
ensure that the system could be assembled/disassembled easily
by field officers.
Therefore MODES_SNM system can ben considered an
hybrid between different industry categories of detection in-
struments, most notably Portable Radiation Scanners (PRS)
and Mobile and Transportable Radiation Monitors (MTRM);
this dual capability reflected on the definition of performance
requirements reported in Sec. IV.
1In this work the term SNM refers to “plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium
enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235” as defined in [2].
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
The MODES_SNM prototype makes use of a set of detec-
tors based on high-pressure cells using noble gas scintillators:
4He for fast neutrons and Xe for gamma rays. The technology
of the high-pressure gas cells was developed by Arktis as a
spin off of CERN based experiments.
4He scintillation detectors feature a much better signal-
to-noise ratio for fast neutrons with respect to the one of
typical detectors employing 3He proportional counters with
polyethylene moderators [3]. In addition, the excellent gamma
ray immunity of such neutron detectors (better than 10−6
[4]) allows detection of neutron signatures at high confidence
level. Moreover 6Li-lined 4He tubes have been developed
to detect slow neutrons. The 6Li layer is significantly more
sensitive to thermal neutrons, whereas only fast neutrons can
produce a detectable signal in the 4He. These two interactions
can be discriminated with Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD),
thus allowing for independent measurements of the slow and
the fast component of the neutron spectrum. Note that 4He
detectors do not need a moderator like 3He detectors, thus
the detected thermal neutron flux is exclusively due to the
source and its surroundings. Consequently, the relative source
strength can provide information about possible shielding of
the neutron source. The active diameter and length of both
detectors are 470 mm and 2”, respectively. MODES_SNM
system includes 8 fast neutron detectors (FND) and 2 6Li-
lined thermal neutron detectors (TND).
Gamma ray Xe-based scintillation detectors have been
developed with very interesting performances [5]. Xe-based
scintillation detectors are robust, vibration insensitive, non-
hygroscopic and scalable to cover also large solid angles.
Furthermore, in the energy region typical for special nuclear
materials (i.e. below 1 MeV) they offer better energy resolu-
tion (6.7 % @ 667 keV [7]) that standard NaI(Tl) detectors (>
8 %). MODES_SNM system incorporates one xenon detector
with an active volume of 8” × 4” (L × D) and a NaI(Tl)
detector (125 mm × 125 mm × 250 mm) which is used to
assure good detection efficiency at energies above 1 MeV.
Power supply to the detectors is provided by three CAEN
HV modules DT5533 (4 kV, 3 mA on 4 channels). The
detector read-out is performed in a fully digital fashion by
using three CAEN digitizers mod. DT5730 (8 channel, 500
MS/s, 14 bit [6]). The FPGAs embedded in the digitizers allow
to perform online part of the analysis such as coincidences,
charge integration of the signals and PSD. A suitable infor-
mation system running on a commercial low-consumption PC
has been developed to manage the acquisition, integrate and
analyze the data, and provide simple information to the user
about the results of the inspections. A commercial Lead-based
battery allows to run the entire system for up to 5 hours.
Detectors are grouped and mounted inside seven Alupanel
boxes, which are held in place by a modular chassis made
of Bosch profiles; the chassis is installed behind the side
door of a commercial van, as shown in Fig. 1. The five
horizontal boxes on the back house the ten neutron detectors;
their active volume is not covered by the two gamma ray
detectors mounted inside the vertical boxes on the front. The
electronics and the computer system are placed behind the
detectors, on the floor of the van. Operators can remotely
operate the system by using any device with WiFi capability.
Detailed informations can be found in [7].
Fig. 1. The configuration of the van-mounted system. The horizontal boxes
house the neutron detectors; gamma ray detectors are mounted vertically on
the front.
IV. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND REQUIREMENTS
Considering the hybrid nature of MODES_SNM system, a
custom set of performance requirements were elaborated by
referring to several publications defining the state-of-the art
for different types of radiation measurement devices (e.g. [9],
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]):
• Probability of Detection (PD) and False Alarm Rate
(FAR): the PD must be at least of 0.9, or 96 per 100
trials; the FAR must not exceed 0.001 (or 1 in 1 hour).
Detailed definitions of FAR, PD, Confidence Level (CL)
and other statistical quantities are reported in [16], [17];
• gamma ray sensitivity: the system shall generate an
alarm when sources are moving with a speed of 0.5 m/s
(1.8 km/h) at a distance of closest approach of 1 m. The
dose rate must be 0.05 µSv/h on the face of the detector;
• neutron sensitivity: the prototype shall generate a neu-
tron alarm for a 252Cf source emitting 1.2×104 neutrons/s
and moving with a speed of 0.5 m/s (1.8 km/h) at a
distance of closest approach of one meter;
• single nuclide identification: the instrument shall be able
to identify every nuclide in the instrument’s library within
60 seconds at an exposure rate from 0.05 µSv/h up to 5.0
µSv/h;
• multiple nuclide identification and masking: the pro-
totype should be able to identify a set of high concern
nuclides (see Table III) under the above conditions with
NORM or radio-pharmaceuticals being simultaneously
present;
• radiation interference: the instrument shall not trigger a
neutron alarm when exposed to a 60Co gamma ray source
producing a dose equivalent rate averaged over the face of
the neutron detector of 100 µSv/h, and it shall continue
to respond to neutrons as specified in the presence of
gamma radiation.
V. DETECTOR COMMISSIONING AT NCBJ S´WIERK
The prototype was laboratory tested and integrated as van-
mounted system by the end of 2013. Once the assembly
was finished, the completed system was moved to Narodowe
Centrum Badan´ Ja˛drowych (NCBJ) in S´wierk (Poland) for
the laboratory characterization of the prototype. In the first
phase several measurements were carried on for all three
types of detectors in order to optimize their performances
and characterize the response to gamma and neutron radiation.
Further tests were then devoted to measure the False Alarm
Rate, the Probability of Detection and to verify identifica-
tion capabilities of various types of gamma ray and neutron
sources.
All the measurements involved fixed sources and have been
carried out in a large experimental hall to ensure a low scat-
tering environment; the environmental conditions resembled as
much as possible those defined as “Standard Test Conditions”
(STC) [13]. Table I presents the environmental conditions
during the PD and FAR tests. Observed humidity values are
lower than the range defined in STC specifications; given the
nature of MODES_SNM detectors, this is expected to have a
negligible influence on system performances.
TABLE I
STC DURING DETECTION TESTS
STC Measured values
Temperature 18 ◦C - 22 ◦C 20 ◦C - 22 ◦C
Pressure 70 kPa - 106 kPa 100 kPa - 102 kPa
Humidity 50% - 75% 34% - 36%
γ radiation background < 250 nSv/h 110 nSv/h
1) 4He Fast Neutron Detectors (FNDs): The response of
FNDs to both neutron and gamma ray sources was measured
in order to choose optimal bias voltages and threshold settings,
ensuring good neutron/gamma discrimination capability and
maximum neutron detection efficiency. Neutron/gamma dis-
crimination in FNDs is performed using the Charge Compari-
son PSD technique [8], where the PSD parameter is calculated
as the ratio between the tail integral and the total integral of
the event pulse.
Each FND was raised 0.9 m above the laboratory floor and
a 252Cf source was placed at the same height. The distance
between the detector and the source was adjusted to obtain
the prescribed flux of 0.1 n/s/cm2; for a 558 kBq source
the distance equals to 228 cm. The FAR and PD tests were
performed by aggregating the neutron events from all eight
detectors available in the prototype. The cycle time was fixed
to 2 s. Considering a source moving at 0.5 m/s as prescribed
by standards, this value corresponds to a space path of 1 m,
twice the active length of a single 4He FND.
Detection tests consisted of 90 minutes of sampling time
with the 252Cf source; the acquisition was then splitted in 449
datasets of equal duration. The number of true positives was
448, the resulting PD being about 97.4% at CL = 95%, thus
satisfying the requirements.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF PD FOR DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF ACTIVE DETECTORS
Average Average
Detectors Trials backgr. cps neutron cps Alarms PD
2 449 0.08 2.73 341 70.7%
3 449 0.13 4.07 341 70.7%
4 449 0.24 5.95 417 89.4%
5 449 0.30 7.57 438 94.8%
6 449 0.36 9.11 438 94.8%
7 449 0.41 11.02 446 96.9%
8 449 0.45 12.55 448 97.4%
A typical distribution of the number of counts in the Region
of Interest (RoI) defined for alarm condition is presented in
Fig. 2. The profiles of background radiation and the source are
clearly well separated.
Additional tests investigated the possibility for the system
to operate with one or more FNDs powered off, exploiting the
high sensitivity of the detectors. Table II presents the analysis
of the counting statistics and achieved level of PD as a function
of the number of active detectors. In all tested scenarios the
alarm threshold was tuned to keep FAR below the level of
1/hour. At a Confidence Level of 95%, the requirement of
PD = 90% was fulfilled even when half of the detectors were
turned off.
Fig. 2. Distribution of number of counts registered with FNDs for background
radiation and 252Cf source.
2) 4He Thermal Neutron Detectors (TNDs): The aim of
the TND tests was to verify the ability of the TNDs to
provide information about the presence of a hydrogen-rich
shield, as is the case of polyethylene. Measurements were
performed in the same conditions as for FNDs by measuring
the number of counts in the regions corresponding to the
fast and thermal neutrons, with and without presence of a
polyethylene shielding.
The shielding surrounding the source was made up of
polyethylene bricks, in a way such that all walls were 100
mm thick, with the exception of the detector-facing side that
was only 50 mm thick. The distance from the source to the
middle of the detector box was kept constant during all the
measurements, with or without the shielding.
A strong increase in the number of thermal neutron events
is observed when the fission source is inserted in the shielding
castle. The number of the counts in the thermal neutron region
with unmoderated sources represents the background for the
identification of a hydrogen-rich shield; the ratio R between
the fast and thermal neutron counting can be used to infer the
presence of a shield.
Considering a 60 s measurement with the 252Cf source,
values of this ratio were R = 0.20 ± 0.27% without the
shielding castle and R = 3.26 ± 0.18% with the shielding
in place, clearly demonstrating the possibility to identify the
presence of a hydrogen-rich moderating material surrounding
a source.
3) Gamma Ray Detection (GRD): The requirement for
GRDs was to detect 241Am, 137Cs and 60Co sources yielding
a dose rate of 50 nSv/h on the face of the detector with PD
≥ 90%, CL = 95% and a maximum FAR of 0.001 (1 false
alarm per hour).
The measurements were carried on in the same hall as the
tests for the FNDs. Each gamma ray tube was raised to 0.9 m
above the floor, with three gamma ray sources placed at the
same height; distances were adjusted to produce the required
dose rate of 50 nSv/h. As in the case of FNDs, the cycle time
was fixed to 2 s. Tests consisted of 450 consecutive cycles for
each of the three sources.
Table III presents the list of sources used together with their
activities at the day of measurement and the results of the
trials.
TABLE III
SOURCES USED FOR EVALUATION OF PD AND RESULTS FOR CL = 95%
Typical energy Activity True
Source [keV] [kBq] Trials positives PD
241Am 59.5 18500 449 449 97.6%
137Cs 662 641 450 450 97.6%
60Co 1173, 1333 239 450 450 97.6%
A typical distribution for the number of counts is presented
in Fig. 3; data were collected with background radiation and
a 137Cs source.
It is clear from Table III and Fig. 3 that the alarm require-
ments were easily satisfied, and the performance of the system
largely exceeded the international requirements for gamma ray
source detection.
Fig. 3. Distribution of number of counts registered with GRDs for background
radiation and 137Cs source.
4) Gamma ray source identification: After triggering an
alarm the system should identify the type of the incident
radiation; Table IV presents the list of sources used to test the
identification performances of the system, along with detector-
source distances corresponding to the 50 nSv/h dose rate
prescribed by the requirements.
TABLE IV
GAMMA RAY SOURCES USED FOR IDENTIFICATION TESTS (* = GAMMA
RAYS NOT RESOLVED BY THE DETECTOR)
Energy Activity Distance
Source [keV] [kBq] [cm]
241Am 59.5 18500 120
57Co 122 3622 91
137Cs 662 641 99
22Na 511, 1275 316 133
60Co 1173, 1333 239 121
109Cd 22, 88 718 80
133Ba 81, 276/303*, 356/384* 979 96
51Cr 320 12800 104
152Eu 122, 245, 344, 779, 1408 319 89
Results of the identification tests show that the standard 60
s time interval was sufficient to identify sources yielding 50
nSv/h at the face of the detectors, for all the sources having
gamma ray energies below 1 MeV. However, at energies above
1 MeV the identification performances became unstable. In the
case of 60Co source, the 60 s interval was too short to identify
the source, although its presence was correctly detected during
the first 2 s cycle.
Since many NORM sources such 40K present energy lines
above 1 MeV, the gamma sensitivity of the system was
increased with the addition of the NaI(Tl) detector before the
beginning of the demonstration phase.
VI. MEASUREMENTS AT JRC ISPRA
To integrate static trials carried out during characterization,
During 2014 the system was tested for the detection of
moving gamma ray and neutron sources as well as for the
detection and identification of 252Cf, (α,n) neutron sources,
Pu and U samples at the ITRAP Laboratory at the European
Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra (Italy).
A. Detection tests with moving sources
According to IAEA requirements for neutron detectors [9],
the prototype shall generate a neutron alarm for a 252Cf source
emitting 1.2 × 104 neutrons/s and moving with a speed of
0.5 m/s (1.8 km/h) at a distance of closest approach between
the source and the system of one meter. This requirement
translates in a static fluence of 0.1 n/s/cm2 at a distance of
1 m. Table V shows the results of the tests. The requirements
prescribe a reference speed of 1.8 km/h, whereas our system
satisfied them even for sources moving at 4.3 km/h, more than
twice that of the standard; detection performances were still
relevant even at four times the reference speed.
TABLE V
RESULTS FOR DYNAMIC SENSITIVITY TESTS WITH NEUTRONS




In the case of gamma ray sensitivity, both xenon and NaI(Tl)
detectors were used to trigger the alarms. The requirements
prescribes the generation of alarms when the 241Am, 137Cs
and 60Co gamma ray sources are moving with a speed of 0.5
m/s (1.8 km/h) at a distance of closest approach of one meter
between the source and the front face of the prototype. During
laboratory tests the distance of closest approach was varied to
compensate for the activity of available sources while respect-
ing the 0.05 µSv/h dose rate requirement. Results are shown in
Table VI. Americium-241, which has a very low-energy line
(59.5 keV), was always detected at standard conditions; for
higher energies the system is performing exceptionally well,
with 100% of the sources detected at all speeds, and taking
into account that in the case of 137Cs the dose was one fifth
of the prescribed one.
TABLE VI
RESULTS FOR DYNAMIC SENSITIVITY TESTS WITH GAMMA RAYS
Source Dose rate [nSv/h] Speed [km/h] Trials Alarms
60Co 50 1.8 30 30
60Co 50 4.3 30 30
60Co 50 7.9 30 30
137Cs 10 1.8 30 30
137Cs 10 4.3 30 30
137Cs 10 7.9 30 30
241Am 50 1.8 30 30
241Am 50 4.3 30 20
Therefore, international requirements for radiation detection
can be considered fully satisfied for both neutron and gamma
ray sources.
B. Identification tests
After the detection sensitivity, the system’s identification
algorithm and library were also extensively tested with both
gamma ray and neutron sources. Table VII reports the identi-
fication results, showing good performances of the prototype.
CBNM61 (1.1% 238Pu, 64.9% 239Pu, 24.8% 240Pu, 3.9%
241Pu, 4.5% 241Am) and CBNM93 (0.01% 238Pu, 93.5%
239Pu, 6.3% 240Pu, 0.1% 241Pu, 0.2% 241Am) were two
plutonium samples, both 6 g in weight, enriched in 239Pu [20];
UP8996 was a 51 g sample of 90% enriched 235U. CBNM93
has a very weak gamma ray signature; at the distance set for
the tests the intensity is close to the limit for alarm triggering,
therefore affecting also identification performances.
TABLE VII
RESULTS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION TESTS. (1) 50 NSV/H; (2) 10 NSV/H;
LEGEND FOR SHIELDING: L = 1 CM LEAD, I = 1 CM IRON, P = 8 CM
POLYETHYLENE, AND COMBINATIONS
Source identification
Source Shield Trials Alarms Valid System output
Am/Be - 10 10 10 Am/Be
Am/Be L I 10 10 10 Am/Be
Am/Be L I P 10 10 10 Shielded Am/Be
CBNM61 - 5 5 5 Pu
CBNM61 L I 5 5 5 Pu
CBNM61 L I P 5 5 5 Shielded Pu
CBNM93 L P 9 7 7 Shielded Pu
UP8996 - 5 5 5 235U
60Co (1) - 10 10 10 60Co
137Cs (2) - 10 10 10 137Cs
241Am (1) - 10 10 10 241Am
Table VIII lists the sources that were programmed inside the
gamma ray identification library before leaving for the field
demonstration.
TABLE VIII
SOURCES INCLUDED IN THE GAMMA RAY IDENTIFICATION LIBRARY
Source Class Source Class
ZnO NORM 57Co Gamma
40K NORM 60Co Gamma
232Th NORM 109Cd Gamma
235U S.N.M. 133Ba Gamma
238U NORM 137Cs Gamma
22Na Gamma 241Am Gamma
VII. FIELD TESTS
After its final assembly in early April the system was left
mounted on the van during both transfers and operations, and
travelled for a grand total of nearly 6000 kilometers without
suffering any damage or performance loss. Figure Fig. 4 shows
the locations of the tests with the van-mounted system.
During the field tests the system was directly employed
by end-users at the Rotterdam and Dublin seaports, at the
Heathrow Airport and in Basel and Uri (Switzerland). In
order to avoid possible shielding effects, tests were always
conducted with the van door open.
Fig. 4. Map of locations reached by MODES_SNM van: L = INFN-LNL,
V = JRC Ispra, R = Rotterdam seaport, H = Heathrow airport, D = Dublin
seaport, G = Switzerland. Countries of consortium partners are highlighted.
A. Rotterdam seaport
The port of Rotterdam is the largest port in the European
Union (EU) and acts as a gateway to the EU as well as
being a major global transport hub. It handles more than 12
million TEUs annually. The scanning of maritime containers to
detect illicit movements of radioactive and nuclear materials is
the responsibility of Dutch customs who devote considerable
resources to this task. They employ a range of fixed, mobile
and hand portable detection systems in this area.
Field trials on MODES_SNM system were performed by
Dutch customs in Rotterdam Port during April 14th to 25th,
2014. For the most part, the system was operated in the course
of normal day-to-day activities, in tandem with the existing
detection equipment.
1) Tests with real cargo: On the first day, MODES_SNM
system was deployed as a secondary control device; secondary
inspections investigate only those cargos that have already
triggered an alarm on radiation portals. The tests were repeated
on day 4. A total of 6 containers alarmed at the fixed RPMs
and were inspected, leading to three identifications of 40K, one
incorrect indication of 137Cs and a couple of false alarms.
On day 2 the system was deployed in static mode as a pri-
mary control mechanism in conjunction with the fixed RPMs,
scanning a total of 131 containers, identifying “NORM”
materials including ceramics, minerals and chemicals.
During these first trials the False Alarm Rate was higher
than expected, but with 8 false alarms in 4 days, and consid-
ering 2 to 5 hours of operation per day, performances were
still within the requirement of 1 false alarm per hour. The
false alarms found a technical explanation resulting in a proper
correction at the end of the field test campaign.
During days 5 to 9, when the system was prepared for the
transfer to the UK, MODES_SNM was deployed in “drive
by” mode scanning static containers at a maximum speed of 10
km/h and at a distance of 30-50 cm from the target containers.
The system identified several NORMs; it also triggered a
number of false alarms, two of which also lead to incorrect
identifications.
When driving the system across the container terminals
numerous gamma ray alarms occurred, with a maximum of
1250 cps (less than 10% above threshold) indicating variation
in backgrounds levels arising from differing natural materials
used in the construction of the terminal surface.
Fig. 5. MODES_SNM performing secondary inspection at Rotterdam seaport
During all these tests, natural background variations proved
to have a significant impact on the behavior of a mobile
system like MODES_SNM, which didn’t have an automated
adjustment procedure. This effect has long being recognized
and it is still being studied (see as an example [?], [19]); its
importance justifies further efforts in its assessment.
2) Tests with radioactive samples: To further assess the
system identification performances, a number of tests were
then carried out on the 6th day using a variety of locally held
known radioactive sources:
• a ceramic plate containing an uranium glaze was held
close to the door aperture of the MODES_SNM van. No
alarm occurred. However, when held close to the NaI(Tl)
detector, a gamma ray alarm of 1500 cps was triggered
and 235U was identified in 60 seconds;
• a gas mantle containing 232Th was held at a distance of
15 cm from the detector. A gamma ray alarm of 1500 cps
was triggered and after 60 seconds 232Th was correctly
identified and 133Ba was also indicated (the 232Th decay
chain contains also a gamma ray line close to the relevant
one in 133Ba);
• approximately 20 g of zirconium sand contained in a
glass vial were held at a distance of 30 cm from the
detector. Following a gamma ray alarm of 5500 cps,
ZnO was identified, but the operators also expected the
identification of 226Ra; it did not happen because at the
time 226Ra was not present in the source library. The test
with zirconium sand was repeated, this time in “drive by”
mode at a distance of 1 meter, at speeds of 10 km/h and
5 km/h. A gamma ray alarm of 1250 cps occurred at 5
km/h, no alarm occurred at 10 km/h;
• the system was driven past a lead shielded Am/Be neutron
source placed on a tripod at 10 km/h at a distance of 1 m
without alarming. This was repeated at 5 km/h resulting
in a fast neutron alarm of 1.5 cps and identification of
“shielded neutron source”. The test was repeated with the
lead shielding removed from the source. Gamma ray and
fast neutron alarms were triggered and both Am/Be and
241Am were identified;
• a 133Ba source was mounted on a tripod and a gamma
ray alarm of 1490 cps at 10 km/h at a distance of 1 meter
occurred. 133Ba was identified.
Given the outcomes of the first days of tests, identification
performances proved to be satisfactory.
Fig. 6. MODES_SNM deployed in static mode near fixed portals
B. London airport
The next stage of the tests involved the transfer of the sys-
tem to the United Kingdom, to be operated in the cargo area of
one of London’s airports; this site acts as a major international
hub handling large volumes of cargo and passengers. Cargo
arriving at terminals are transported in trucks and vans and
scanned by fixed RPMs.
Field trials on the MODES_SNM system were performed
by the United Kingdom Border Force (UKBF) during May 2nd
to 7th, 2014. The system was operated in the course of normal
day-to-day activities, mostly in static mode and in tandem with
the existing detection equipment.
A total of 635 cargo carrying vehicles were scanned, passing
at speed of 8-16 km/h. The system behaved as follows:
• a strong gamma ray alarm was generated while a vehicle
was passing. After stopping the cargo, MODES_SNM re-
peatedly identified the presence of 60Co, a result âA˘N´con-
sistent with the accompanying documents and confirmed
by a commercial hand-held device;
• the system returned a gamma ray alarm for a consignment
of medical isotopes; over multiple tentatives, the system
once proposed identification as “Am/Be shielded neutron
source”, but a definitive identification was not possible.
That isolated misidentification is considered the result
of one false thermal neutron alarm combined with the
presence of isotopes not included in the source library;
• the system successfully identified two other 60Co sources
shielded by stainless steel after 60 seconds.
• the False Alarm number was around 30, still close to the
1 FA/hour requirement;
In addition MODES_SNM system drove past a container
known to contain 60Co contaminated metal products. At a
passing speed of 8-16 km/h and at a distance of 15 meters
from the source the system alarmed and performed a correct
source identification.
C. Dublin customs
Dublin Port is the largest port in Ireland and handles a
variety of containerized, bulk and car ferry traffic. The Dublin
field tests were carried out during May 9th to 16th, 2014.
In addition to the continuance of evaluating the technical
capability of the MODES_SNM system, the assessment of
the potential for its deployment in a variety of operational
scenarios was an important consideration in this phase of the
field testing.
On the first day, tests were conducted in conjunction with
an X-ray scanning operation at container compound in Dublin
Port. No difficulties were encountered in setting up the sys-
tem. The van was deployed in static mode approximately 50
meters distant from the 6 MeV mobile X-ray scanner, without
experiencing any interference. The X-ray scanner incorporates
an integrated Radiological/Nuclear detection system which
operates in conjunction with the X-ray scanning. A total of 9
inward bound maritime containers, as well as 1 vehicle were
scanned. No true positive alarms were triggered.
The following day, scanning took place at a car ferry
compound where a total of 74 inward bound trailers and
vehicles were scanned. No true positive alarms were triggered
although 3 gamma ray alarms occurred when no target was in
range.
On the third day, MODES_SNM system was brought to
University College Dublin for testing with a sealed 37 GBq
Pu/Be source containing 16 g of 239Pu oxide mixed with
beryllium metal. The source was transferred from its storage
area to a smaller paraffin-filled drum which was placed in
a customs van. During testing, the van containing the Pu/Be
neutron source was driven past the van-mounted system, which
was deployed in stationary mode. Measured neutron dose at
1 m from the shielded drum, as determined with an EG&G
Berthold LB6411 neutron probe, was 5 - 6 µSv/hr. The
corresponding figure for gamma ray dose rate, measured with
an EG&G Berthold LB1236 proportional counter, was about
1 µSv/hr.
Passing with a speed of approximately 8 km/h and at a
stand-off distance of 1 meter from the van, the source triggered
gamma ray, fast neutron and thermal neutron alarms. The
passing speed was increased to 20 km/h and the distance to
4 meters, which were the maximum values permitted by the
site conditions, and on each occasion all three alarms were
triggered.
Scanning loose or bulk materials is often problematic at
BCPs. For example, there is significant trade in exporting
“end of life” vehicles and other metal equipment to Africa.
By its nature, this type of cargo is not always suitable
for scanning by fixed detection systems. MODES_SNM was
therefore deployed to scan this type of cargo in an open
compound in Dublin Port in mobile or “drive by” mode. No
alarms were triggered by this cargo, although a number of
gamma ray alarms, caused by variation in background levels
(and confirmed by elevated readings on a hand-held device)
occurred. MODES_SNM was again deployed (static mode)
in proximity to the X-ray container scanner, this time at a
distance of approximately 30 meters, resulting in a gamma
ray alarm.
The system was then deployed, again in “drive by” mode,
at a warehouse where a variety of goods are stored. The van
screened cargo within the warehouse passing along the aisles
between the racks. No alarms were triggered. The van was
then moved to the adjoining compound and screened a variety
of vehicles, containers, tankers, machinery and equipment. No
alarms were triggered except for elevated background alarms
which occurred from time to time in various regions of the
compound.
D. Swiss Heavy Goods Vehicles control center and customs
At the end of operations at Dublin seaport, the system was
brought back to Padova to check the system and perform
some software update. The updated MODES_SNM system
was field tested at the Swiss border in Basel, Switzerland,
and at the Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) control center in
Uri, Switzerland.
Fig. 7. Man-Machine Interface: the graphical Gamma ray rate monitor.
During the shown measurement sequence, five vans passed; the reduction
of background due to the shielding effect of the vans is clearly visible.
At the Swiss Customs controls in Basel, the MODES_SNM
system was tested at two different sites to see the different
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) involved. The system be-
haved as expected. No alarm occured. The background was
around 1.8-2 kHz, falling to 1.2-1.5 kHz when a truck passed
through (Fig. 7). This effect shows clearly the known influence
of the trucks to background shielding and the sensitivity of the
system.
On the second day, operations were held at HGV. The center
is located in front of the Gotthard tunnel in Switzerland and
about 1300-1500 trucks pass through it every day. Tests were
perfomed within a 2.5 h window. 218 trucks passed by the
van at a speed between 5 km/h and 25 km/h.
Four alarms occurred, a value slightly higher than the
FAR requirement of 1 per hour. These alarms occurred when
no truck was present and showed the same pattern on the
instrument panel. By analyzing the logged data the origin of
these events was identified and corrected on the software side;
no more of these false alarms have occurred since then.
VIII. RESULTS
Results from the field tests demonstrated that
MODES_SNM system is very robust, having survived
all transportations over more than 6000 km and end-user
operation under different conditions. The end-users are able to
run the system without problems and without the supervision
of technical experts. The van-mounted system showed great
potential; its detection performances proved to be comparable
and in some cases even surpassing those of commercial
systems while providing additional features which are of
high importance to customers. The demonstration campaign
showed only one relevant issue concerning the occasional
triggering of false alarms, a problem identified and solved at
the end of the field tests. At this time the system is capable
of detection and identification of gamma ray sources and
NORMs, neutron sources as 252Cf, Am/Be, Pu/Be and SNM
as Pu and U samples; it can also detect the presence of
hydrogenated or lead shielding enclosing neutron sources. A
commercial van was further developed after the end of the
project; it is currently being tested for full compliance with
ANSI N42.43 standard.
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